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Summary
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that one’s volun-
tary actions produce external sensory events [1, 2]. Several
psychological theories hypothesized links between SoA
and affective evaluation [3–6]. For example, people tend to
attribute positive outcomes to their own actions, perhaps
reflecting high-level narrative processes that enhance self-
esteem [3]. Here we provide the first evidence that such
emotional modulations also involve changes in the low-level
sensorimotor basis of agency. The intentional binding para-
digm [1] was used to quantify the subjective temporal
compression between a voluntary action and its sensory
consequences, providing an implicit measure of SoA.
Emotional valence of action outcomes was manipulated by
following participants’ key-press actions with negative or
positive emotional vocalizations [7], or neutral sounds. We
found that intentional binding was reduced for negative
compared to positive or neutral outcomes. Discriminant an-
alyses identified a change in time perception of both actions
and their negative outcomes, demonstrating that the experi-
ence of action itself is subject to affective modulation. A
small binding benefit was also found for positive action
outcomes. Emotional modulation of SoA may contribute to
regulating social behavior. Correctly tracking the valenced
effects of one’s voluntary actions on other people could
underlie successful social interactions.Results and Discussion
Humans are constantly interacting with the surrounding envi-
ronment through voluntary, instrumental actions. The brain
processes the causal relationship between actions and their
sensory outcomes, which produces a subjective sense of
agency (SoA) over these external events [1, 2]. SoA is assumed
to underlie the ability to learn and execute goal-oriented
behaviors, but this link has rarely been tested directly. Since
our actions normally aim at positive rather than negative*Correspondence: m_yoshie@08.alumni.u-tokyo.ac.jp (M.Y.), p.haggard@
ucl.ac.uk (P.H.)
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are credited.outcomes, we speculated that SoA should vary with the
emotional valence of action outcomes. Several accounts of
cognitive mechanisms of self-presentation suggest this
should be so: people claim more responsibility for positive
events than negative ones (self-serving biases), which seems
to be a mechanism for enhancing self-esteem [3, 4].
Conversely, when people perform a morally unacceptable
action, they may reduce their SoA through cognitive restruc-
turing of the causal relationship between their action and its
harmful effects (moral disengagement) [5, 6]. These theories
are normally based on explicit self-reports of responsibility,
which may be influenced by postperceptual effects, such as
social desirability and cognitive dissonance. It remains unclear
whether the low-level sensorimotor experience of agency is
altered by valence. Therefore, we have investigated, appar-
ently for the first time, whether the affective value of action
outcomes also alters low-level implicit measures of SoA.
We used the intentional binding paradigm [1] as an implicit,
quantitative proxymeasure of SoA (Figure 1A). While viewing a
continuously rotating clock, participants pressed a key at a
time of their choosing, which produced a sound after a fixed
delay of 250 ms (agency condition). Participants then judged
where the clock hand was at the onset of their key press or,
in a separate block, at the onset of the sound. We first
measured a judgment error (i.e., difference between the
judged and actual time of a corresponding event) for each trial
in each condition. A positive judgment error indicated a
delayed judgment, while negative error indicated anticipatory
judgment. Next, we compared mean judgment errors in sin-
gle-event baseline conditions, where participants pressed
the key without producing the sound (baseline action), or
heard the sound at random intervals without pressing the
key (baseline sound), to mean judgment errors for the same
event in the agency condition. Finally, to provide a single
composite binding measure, quantifying the overall subjective
temporal association between actions and outcomes, we
combined the shift in action judgment and that in sound judg-
ment, inverting the sign of the latter [8, 9].
We used this paradigm to investigate whether SoA is altered
by the emotional content of action outcomes. The voluntary
action could produce an emotionally negative outcome, an
emotionally positive outcome, or a neutral outcome. Each of
these three affective conditions was tested in a separate block
of trials. Each key presswas thus followed by one of four nega-
tive emotional vocalizations (two fear sounds, two disgust
sounds, randomized) or by one of four positive emotional
vocalizations (two achievement sounds, two amusement
sounds, randomized). These sounds were independently vali-
dated by a separate group of participants [7]. A subset of par-
ticipants also performed a neutral condition in which actions
were followed by one of four pure tones, matched for average
pitch and duration with the vocalization stimuli (Table S1 avail-
able online). To ensure vigilance and attention to the auditory
stimuli, we asked a question about the frequency of sounds
(i.e., which of the four sounds they heard most frequently dur-
ing an w3 min subblock) at the end of every subblock. The
experimental procedures were approved by the University
College London Ethics Committee for Human Research.
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm and Auditory Stimuli
(A) Intentional binding paradigm. In the agency condition participants’
voluntary action (key press) produced negative, neutral, or positive sounds.
Using a continuously rotating clock, participants reported the perceived
onset time of their action or the sound. The mean judgment error (i.e., differ-
ence between the judged and actual time of a corresponding event) in
agency conditions was compared with that in single-event baseline condi-
tions to calculate the shift in action or sound judgment. We also calculated
ameasure of composite binding by combining the shifts in action and sound
judgments.
(B) Perceived emotional valence of auditory stimuli. Participants rated nega-
tive sounds to be more negative and positive sounds to be more positive
than neutral sounds.
(C) Perceived emotional arousal of auditory stimuli. Participants rated both
negative and positive sounds to be more emotionally arousing than neutral
sounds. There was no difference in arousal rating between negative and
positive sounds, indicating that we could effectively manipulate emotional
valence of action outcomes while controlling for emotional arousal.
Data are presented as mean 6 SEM. ***p < 0.001. See also Figure S1 and
Table S1.
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confirmed the perceived valence of the sounds (F [2, 64] =
247.8, p < 0.0001). Negative sounds were rated as more nega-
tive than neutral sounds (p < 0.0001) and positive sounds as
more positive than neutral sounds (p < 0.0001). In contrast,
the reported level of arousal (Figure 1C) did not significantly
differ between negative and positive sounds (p = 0.56), sug-
gesting that we successfully controlled for effects of emotional
arousal. As expected, perceived arousal was lower for neutral
sounds than negative (p < 0.0001) or positive (p < 0.0001)
vocalizations. In keeping with the arousal ratings, the meannumber of correct answers to questions about the frequency
of sounds did not differ between the negative and positive
conditions (Figure S1).
In experiment 1, we tested a sample of 16 native English
speakers (eight males and eight females) using negative and
positive emotional vocalizations (Figure 2A; Table S2). The
composite binding measure clearly demonstrated that inten-
tional binding was smaller in the negative than positive condi-
tion (T15 = 23.11, p = 0.0072). That is, the subjective temporal
compression between actions and positive sounds was stron-
ger than that between actions and negative sounds. Thus, SoA
can be modulated by emotional valence of action outcomes.
To investigate whether this reflects a cost of SoA for nega-
tive outcomes or a benefit for positive outcomes, experiment
2 tested a new sample of 18 native English speakers (nine
males and nine females) using neutral sounds in addition to
negative and positive vocalizations (Figure 2B; Table S2).
One participant was excluded because of highly erratic tem-
poral judgments (mean SD of judgment errors across trials >
300 ms; rejected by Smirnov-Grubbs tests for outliers, p <
0.05) [10, 11]. The composite binding again varied across
different sound conditions (F [2, 32] = 4.90, p = 0.014). Post
hoc comparisons replicated the significant difference in the
size of intentional binding between the negative and positive
conditions (p = 0.0073). Importantly, composite binding was
significantly reduced in the negative condition compared to
the neutral condition (p = 0.025), while no difference was found
between the neutral and positive conditions (p = 0.50). The
results from experiment 2 suggested that negative outcomes
attenuate SoA, while enhancement of SoA due to positive
outcomeswas less reliable. Finally, a pooled analysis of exper-
iment 1 and the negative and positive conditions of experiment
2 confirmed a highly significant effect of valence on intentional
binding (T32 = 24.40, p = 0.00011; Figure 2C; Figure 2D;
Table S2).
Intentional binding involves a perceptual shift in the time of
action toward outcome, and also a shift in the opposite direc-
tion, of the outcome toward the action that caused it. These
shifts may dissociate and could reflect separate mechanisms
[12, 13]. We therefore used linear discriminant analysis to
quantify the contributions of action shift and sound shift to
the effects of emotional valence on SoA.
For experiment 1, inspection of standardized discriminant
coefficients showed that the difference between positive and
negative valence depended on both action shift (standardized
coefficient = 21.24) and on sound shift (standardized coeffi-
cient = 1.87; the sign reversal is explained by the different
direction of action and sound shifts). For experiment 2, the first
canonical discriminant extracts themain variation between the
three conditions. It accounted for 60% of the between-condi-
tion variance and effectively separated the negative condition
from the neutral and positive conditions (Figure 3A). Inspection
of standardized coefficients again showed that both action
shift (1.28) and sound shift (20.91) contributed strongly to
altered perception when generating emotionally negative out-
comes. Supporting this finding, univariate tests showed that
the decrease in action shift from the neutral to negative condi-
tion did not significantly differ from the decrease in sound shift
(T16 = 21.04, p = 0.31; Figure 3B). The second discriminant,
accounting for 40% of the variance between conditions, pri-
marily separated the positive condition from the neutral and
negative conditions. It loaded much less on action shift (0.45)
than on sound shift (2.44). Again, univariate tests were consis-
tent with this result: the change in sound shift from the neutral
Figure 2. Intentional Binding for Sounds with Different Emotional Valence
(A) In experiment 1 (n = 16), composite binding was significantly smaller for the negative than positive sounds.
(B) In experiment 2 (n = 17), the emotional modulation of intentional binding was replicated. In addition, the size of binding effect for positive sounds was
similar to that for neutral sounds.
(C) The statistical comparison on the whole sample (n = 33) revealed a strong effect of emotional valence on intentional binding.
(D) The differences in composite binding between negative and positive sounds were all significant (ps < 0.01). No significant difference was found between
sounds with the same emotional valence (fear versus disgust, or achievement versus amusement).
Data are presented as mean 6 SEM. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. See also Table S2.
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shift (T16 = 2.70, p = 0.016; Figure 3B). The order of the variates
could be taken as indicating that the agency cost of negative
outcomes exceeds the agency benefit of positive outcomes,
but we would urge caution regarding this interpretation. First,
some theories treat emotions as distinct categories, rather
than as a continuous dimension extending from negative,
through neutral, to positive. Second, we did not attempt to
measure valence using an interval scale, so we cannot be
certain that our negative and positive stimuli were matched
for strength relative to neutral. In fact, the difference in valence
ratings between negative and neutral was significantly less
than the difference between neutral and positive (T32 =
22.12, p = 0.042). This suggests that the predominant effect
of negative valence on binding, as captured by the first canon-
ical variate, was not simply an artifactual consequence of
choosing very strongly negative stimuli. However, we suggest
caution in comparing the costs of negative valence to the ben-
efits of positive valence, since the only quantification of
valence is a rating scale that may not have interval properties.
Our results provide the first direct and objective evidence
for the modulation of SoA by affective significance of action
outcomes. In two experiments, we showed that intentional
binding was attenuated for negative compared to positive or
neutral outcomes. Linear discriminant analyses indicated
that this emotional modulation was driven by shifts in
the perceived time of both actions and outcomes. In addi-
tion, the effect primarily involved a reduced binding for nega-
tive outcomes rather than increased binding for positive
outcomes.
Our experimental design allowed us to clearly link differ-
ences in intentional binding between conditions to differences
in emotional valence. Importantly, the observed effects cannot
be explained by emotional arousal, because there was no
difference in perceived arousal between the negative and pos-
itive conditions (Figures 1C and S1). A recent study [9] com-
bined intentional binding with various morally relevant visual
stimuli. Severely negative moral outcomes led to stronger
binding than less negative outcomes, which is opposite tothe effect found here. However, that experiment differed
from ours in two important ways. First, their outcomes were
unpredictable, whereas valence of each trial was predictable
in advance in our design. Second, they also found that
increasing the magnitude of a nonmoral outcome produced
a similar enhancement of binding. This suggests that themoral
and nonmoral effects in that study may have been byproducts
of a general influence of magnitude on arousal or salience,
rather than an effect of valence. In our study, in contrast,
valence is defined by sign (positive/negative), rather than
magnitude. Furthermore, the effects observed in our study
cannot be attributed to the differences in acoustic properties
of the stimuli. We not only carefully minimized the differences
in physical properties such as pitch and duration (Table S1),
but also included a nonagency single-event baseline condition
for each set of sounds. We then analyzed the change in judg-
ment errors from the baseline to agency block for each
emotional condition. Any effects of different acoustic proper-
ties on the perception of sound onsets, such as the percep-
tual-center effect [14] should be common to both agency
and baseline blocks and should therefore be controlled for
when these are subtracted to calculate perceptual shift. The
observed effects also cannot be attributed to the individual
identity of voices. To control this factor, in the negative and
positive conditions, we randomly intermixed four emotional
vocalizations produced by four different individuals varying
in age and gender. Moreover, we confirmed that the observed
modulation of intentional binding was consistent across
different sounds with the same emotional valence (Figure 2D).
A recent study of SoA in economic contexts showed
reduced intentional binding when participants lost money
compared to when they gained or retained money [11]. Our
study supports those authors’ finding that negative outcomes
can reduce SoA, but in relation to an affective rather than
an economic neurocognitive system. We studied actions
that produced sensory outcomes with inherently different
emotional valences, while their study manipulated outcome
value using neutral sounds that were associated with different
monetary reward. Therefore, we believe that our study may be
Figure 3. Results of Linear Discriminant Analysis
of Experiment 2
(A) The action shifts and sound shifts from experi-
ment 2 were compared between the negative,
neutral, and positive conditions using linear
discriminant analysis. The graph shows the mean
ofeachconditionon thefirstandsecondcanonical
variates. The axis scales have been adjusted ac-
cording to the different proportions of between-
condition variance explained by each variate (see
the main text). The first canonical variate effec-
tively separated the negative condition from the
neutral and positive conditions, and the second
canonical variate separated the positive condition
from the negative and neutral conditions.
(B) The graph shows themean absolute values of action and sound shifts for each of the three emotional conditions. Inspection of standardized coefficients
and additional paired t tests (see the main text) clearly demonstrated that the attenuation of intentional binding for negative outcomes was driven by both
action shift and sound shift. Increased binding for positive outcomes, on the other hand, was explained largely by sound shift. See themain text for loadings
of canonical variates on action and sound shifts and for further explanation.
Data are presented as mean 6 SEM.
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study, the perception of emotion was completely irrelevant
to participants’ task: participants were asked to judge timing
of action/sound onsets and to attend only to the number of
times the different sounds were presented. Testing at the
end of each subblock suggested that levels of vigilance could
not account for our valence effects (Figure S1). Therefore,
these specific effects of emotional valence on SoA are auto-
matic and implicit. In contrast, in the previous study of reward
[11], participants presumably intended to gain as muchmoney
as possible, which made outcome valence highly relevant to
task success.
In principle, the binding effects we observed could involve
either prediction of action outcomes or a postdictive recon-
struction of experience occurring after the valence of the
outcome is known. Previous research suggested that predic-
tion dominates intentional binding when the action outcome
probability is high, while reconstruction may be important
when outcome probability is low [10]. In our study, different
emotional valences were tested in separate blocks and were
entirely predictable. In contrast, previous studies investigated
changes in SoA for moral and economic outcomes that were
completely unpredictable [9, 11]. Thus, in those studies, any
modulation of binding effects must be purely reconstructive.
Although we did not directly compare predictive and recon-
structive contributions to SoA, our data suggest that the
emotional modulation of SoA could also reflect predictions
about the likely valence of outcomes. Future research should
examine which of the two components (i.e., predictive
or reconstructive) dominates in different social/emotional
situations.
Psychological theories of self-serving biases highlight a
general tendency to claim more responsibility for positive
than negative events [3, 4]. Our results suggest that unwilling-
ness to take responsibility for unpleasant outcomes may
involve a low-level sensorimotor basis. Becoming inured to a
predictable negative impact of our own actions may produce
a kind of dissociative experience. The reduced SoA for nega-
tive outcomes may reflect a psychological mechanism to
retain self-esteem [3]. Moreover, SoA is clearly linked to
responsibility. Strong feelings of responsibility for all negative
outcomes might discourage people from attempting any goal-
directed actions in the future. Our finding of low binding for
negative outcomes may be part of an optimistic bias that en-
courages future action and counteracts ‘‘depressive realism’’[15]. Although here we focused on perceived emotional
valence of action outcomes, participants’ own vigilance or
emotional state could also interact with the effects of
perceived emotion. Previous studies suggest that self-serving
biases are attenuated in individuals with depression or self-
focusing cognitive style [4]. Future work could usefully investi-
gate how participants’ emotional statemodulates the affective
influence on SoA.
Although the social self-other dimension was not systemat-
ically manipulated in these experiments, our results are highly
relevant to social interaction. Our experimental situation can
be interpreted as one’s own voluntary key-press action having
either a positive or negative effect on another person’s vocally
expressed mental state. The ability to monitor and respond
correctly to the effects of one’s own action on others is a
fundamental prerequisite of successful social behavior and is
carefully trained and maintained by human cultures. It is
compromised in several clinical conditions, notably autism
spectrum disorders, psychopathy, and sociopathy. Our data
show a reduced SoA for actions that might be treated as so-
cially maleficent, as opposed to neutral or socially beneficial.
We did not investigate empathy or social factors directly, but
our data are consistent with the possibility that individuals
with different degrees of emotional bias, or different respon-
sivity to the emotions of others, may experience their social
actions rather differently.We predict that prosocial and antiso-
cial personality traits should interact with the valence effects
on SoA shown here. Clinical disorders of social behavior may
reflect extremes of this spectrum. Our methods may therefore
be useful as assessments of, or interventions in, the primary
experience of social behavior of such patients.
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